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Recent evidence demonstrates that humans are not the only species to respond negatively
to inequitable outcomes which are to their disadvantage. Several species respond negatively
if they subsequently receive a less good reward than a social partner for completing the same
task. While these studies suggest that the negative response to inequity is not a uniquely
human behavior, they do not provide a functional explanation for the emergence of these
responses due to similar characteristics among these species. However, emerging data support
the hypothesis that an aversion to inequity is a mechanism to promote successful long-term
cooperative relationships amongst non-kin. In this paper, I discuss several converging lines of
evidence which illustrate the need to further evaluate this relationship. First, cooperation can
survive modest inequity; in explicitly cooperative interactions, individuals are willing to continue
to cooperate despite inequitable outcomes as long as the partner’s overall behavior is equitable.
Second, the context of inequity affects reactions to it in ways which support the idea that
joint efforts lead to an expectation of joint payoffs. Finally, comparative studies indicate a link
between the degree and extent of cooperation between unrelated individuals in a species and
that species’ response to inequitable outcomes. This latter line of evidence indicates that this
behavior evolved in conjunction with cooperation and may represent an adaptation to increase
the payoffs associated with cooperative interactions. Together these data inform a testable
working hypothesis for understanding decision-making in the context of inequity and provide
a new, comparative framework for evaluating decision-making behavior.
Keywords: inequity, cooperation, non-human primates, apes, monkeys, evolution of behavior, comparative approach

Introduction
When making decisions about resources, humans show an intense
interest in how their outcomes compare to those of others. In the
laboratory, people will reject absolute gains in order to keep others from receiving more (Guth et al., 1982), even if this results in
greater inequity (Yamagishi et al., 2009). This behavior seems to
affect offers, too; individuals offer more when their partner has a
chance to refuse than when they have no recourse (e.g., comparing the ultimatum to the dictator games; Camerer, 2003). People’s
reaction to inequity is also highly context dependent. Subjects make
different decisions if the right to control distributions must be
earned (Hoffman et al., 1994) or if they have an opportunity to
respond in some other way (Xiao and Houser, 2005). We do not
make decisions in a vacuum, but instead seem to care very much
how our outcomes compare to those of our social partners.
Although much of this research is done using the ultimatum
game, another important game in this vein is the impunity game. In
this game, one individual, the proposer, is given an endowment of
money and must decide how to split the money between themselves
and another individual, the responder. The responder then has two
options; if they accept, the distribution is given to each individual as
proposed, as in the ultimatum game, but if they reject, the proposer
receives their money, but the responder receives nothing. This game
is little studied, likely because refusing results in both less absolute
gain and increased relative inequity for the responder, thus it was
assumed that no rational actor would refuse (in the Ultimatum
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game, refusing results in less absolute gain, but increased relative
equity, as both participants get nothing; Bolton and Zwick, 1995).
Note, too, that peoples’ refusals in this context are not inequity
aversion as proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), as individuals are increasing rather than decreasing inequity. However, recent
evidence indicates that people routinely refuse unequal offers in
the impunity game, making this an important set of circumstances
to evaluate more fully (Yamagishi et al., 2009).
Humans are not alone in this. Other species show very similar
behaviors. In a game reminiscent of an impunity game, two species
of primate have been shown to refuse rewards more often when
their partners get better rewards than when their partners receive
the same, lower-value rewards (Brosnan, 2006; details in next section). While this behavior seems economically irrational, it is a
very consistent response in both these primates and humans. This
raises questions about the evolution of this behavior on a number
of levels. First, is it possible that the underlying function of this
behavior is similar across species, including humans? Second, even
if the behavior has been selected for similar reasons, what are the
mechanisms that lead to the behavior? Related to this, how do we
account for the individual differences seen in the behavior, and
are these differences, and their causes, consistent across species?
Although the data we have now provide pieces of the puzzle,
there is as yet no satisfying functional explanation, and the very
ubiquity of the response demands an answer. One hypothesis is
that recognizing and responding to inequitable outcomes increases
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individuals’ payoffs from cooperation. If this is the case in humans,
it may be in other species as well, but only recently has enough
data emerged to begin to address this hypothesis in species other
than humans. In this paper, I discuss this emerging evidence in
non-human primates, and based on three main lines of inquiry
put forth the hypothesis that there has been co-evolution between
cooperation and inequity across the animal kingdom. I discuss the
implications of this hypothesis for other, related, areas of inquiry.
Finally, I end with ideas for further tests to evaluate and refine this
hypothesis, both in primates and other species.
Inequity paradigms in other species

Given inherent species differences, most of the protocols for studying inequity in other species are simpler than those in humans, for
instance requiring no verbal instruction. In the typical paradigm,
two individuals from the same social group are paired, and they
must alternately complete a task to receive a reward (see Figure 1
for details of the experimental procedure). Each can see the others’
performance and the others’ outcomes. In the baseline condition,
rewards are the same, but in the inequity condition, one partner
receives a reward which is more preferred (e.g., based on previous
preference tests between the rewards; see Table 1). Thus we can
compare individuals’ reactions to a reward when their partner gets
the same reward as they do versus a more preferred one. Additional
controls can examine potentially mediating factors such as the role
of differential effort or the way in which the mere presence of
higher-value rewards (which are not given to a conspecific) may
affect reactions. Such studies have now been done in a variety of
primates, as have similar studies in other taxa (Heidary et al., 2008;
Range et al., 2008).
Decisions to refuse a reward stem from many factors, nonetheless these results cannot be fully explained by processes other than
the aversion to inequitable outcomes. For instance, it has been proposed that refusals of rewards may be due to a “frustration effect,”
in which subjects compare their current outcomes to those which
they received previously, and protest if the comparison comes up
wanting (Roma et al., 2006). Such individual contrast effects are
seen in a wide variety of species (Tinklepaugh, 1928; Friedan et al.,

Figure 1 | A schematic diagram indicating the procedure for each trial of
an inequity test. Two primates (P1 and P2) are tested in a pair. For each
condition (see Table 1, columns 1 and 2), the primates must sequentially
perform a task with the experimenter (typically a token exchange; Table 1,
column 3) in order to receive a food reward (Table 1, column 4; see full
description of each condition in column 5). An arrow indicates the order in
which the object (token or food) moves between the experimenter (E) and the
primates in each step of the trial. In all studies in my laboratory, primates are
seated side-by-side. Monkeys are separated by a mesh barrier which they can
reach through while apes are not separated. The details of the exchange task
and the foods given to each primate are determined by the test condition; for
details see Table 1.
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2009), however they do not explain these results. In controlled
experiments, the mere presence of the higher-value rewards did
not cause increased rejections, even when the experimenter called
the subjects’ attention to the preferred reward prior to each interaction (Brosnan et al., 2010a). Of course it is likely that these two
phenomena are built on similar cognitive underpinnings; in both
cases, subjects compare their current outcomes to some other referent and find the current outcome wanting. However, in the case
of the “frustration” effect, the referent is individual, or one’s own
previous outcomes, whereas in the case of inequity, the referent is
social, or one’s partners’ outcomes. Thus the response to inequity
can be thought of as a “social contrast” or “social frustration” effect.
Given the ubiquity of individual contrast effects, as well as attention to others’ outcomes (e.g., in the context of social learning), we
might expect inequity responses to be widespread.
Primates also show quite a bit of variation in their responses.
Considering only chimpanzees, responses vary both within and
between experiments. Thus far, factors which have been implicated
in this variation include dominance rank, sex, and group identity.
Other factors, such as personality and individuals’ relationships
are also likely to play a role. However there is not yet consistency
in which factors affect behavior, probably due to both interactions
between these and other effects and the relatively small sample size
which has been tested (approximately three dozen chimpanzees,
which is large for primate studies, but too small to pinpoint such
interactions). Larger studies are currently underway to investigate
this variation. It is also not yet clear how this compares to interindividual differences in humans, as studies with humans typically
focus on mean responses rather than individual behavior.

Hypotheses for the function of the response to
inequity
It has been proposed that the inequity response functions to increase
the success of long-term cooperative relationships amongst unrelated individuals (hereafter cooperation; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Brosnan, 2006). Although this was originally proposed with respect
to humans, new evidence provides support for this hypothesis in an
evolutionary context. Specifically, the ability to recognize situations
in which one is receiving a less good outcome than a partner, or
inequity, may allow individuals to determine when their cooperative partners are taking more than their fair share and are thus no
longer to one’s benefit as a partner. In other words, an aversion
to inequity can be a mechanism which encourages individuals to
switch to a new partner when they find themselves in a situation
which is not to their advantage. This ultimately functions to increase
payoffs by encouraging individuals to seek out new partners. If the
new partner is more equitable, then there is a benefit and the individual will have an absolute gain, despite temporary costs associated
with time spent searching for new partners or potential interludes
with other inequitable individuals. This mechanism would be under
strong positive selection due to the potential for large fitness gains.
Note that while the original inequity aversion formulation assumed
that individuals were averse to decisions which increased relative
inequity (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), even reactions that increase
short-term inequity (e.g., in the Impunity game) may serve to
increase long-term equity by moving actors in to relationships
which are more beneficial.
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Table 1 | Description of experimental conditions (for a summary of the procedure, see Figure 1 and associated caption).
Abbreviation

Condition name	Exchange

Food

Description

ETLV

Equity test, low value

Both exchange

Both low value

Both subject and partner exchanged for low value reward.

ETHV

Equity test, high value

Both exchange

Both high value

Both subject and partner exchanged for high value reward.

FC

Food control

Both exchange

Both see high value before

Prior to exchange, high value reward is held in front of

			

exchange, receive low

exchanger and then is placed back in container. After

			

value following exchange

successful completion of exchange, exchanger

				

receives low value reward.

IT

Partner exchanges for high value reward and subject

Inequity test

Both exchange

Subject low value

			

Partner high value

exchanges for low value reward.

GR

Subject low value

Partner is given a high value reward for “free” (e.g.,

Partner high value

without exchange) and then subject is given a low

Gift reward

No exchange

			

				
DT

Delay test

Both exchange,

value reward.

Both high value

Partner exchanges for a high value reward and

		

subject waits 10 s		

subject exchanges and must wait 10 s before

		

after exchange 		

receiving high value reward.

		

before receiving food

DETLV

Differential exchange

Subject exchanges

test, low value

Partner does not 		

Both low value

Partner is given a low value reward for “free” (e.g.,
without exchange) and subject must exchange for a

		

exchange		

low value reward.

DETHV

Subject exchanges

Partner is given a high value reward for “free” (e.g.,

Differential exchange
test, high value

		

Both high value

Partner does not 		

without exchange) and subject must exchange for a

exchange		

high value reward.

Not all conditions are used in all experiments, but all are provided to give an overview of the types of questions which have been asked. The most critical tests are
the ETLV, which collects baseline data on responses to lower-value rewards, the IT, which collects data on responses to lower-value rewards when one’s partner
receives higher-value ones, and the FC, which is a control to determine reactions to lower-value rewards are present, but no primates receive one. Reprinted with
permission from Brosnan et al. (2010a).

Note, too, that this would not need to be consciously understood
by the individual; those who developed an aversion to inequity
through whatever mechanism (e.g., an emotional reaction) would
be more likely to succeed, increasing the frequency of the reaction
in the population. Considering one possible scenario, in most cases
in which individuals experience inequity during or immediately
following an interaction with another individual (e.g., not just in
proximity to another, but after explicitly interacting with them), the
inequity is likely to be related to the other’s actions. Although there
would undoubtedly be a few situations in which this was not the
case, this would be somewhat ameliorated if individuals kept track
of more than one interaction in the relationship history, as they
can do (Brosnan et al., 2006). Thus individuals who happened to
respond in these situations could develop the behavior without an
understanding of the others intentions or motives (although note
that primates likely have the requisite understanding of intentionality and ability to inhibit; see The Context of the Interaction and
Inequity and Self-Control). Alternatively, this mechanism could
function similarly to that which has been proposed for attitudinal
reciprocity, in which individuals base their moves on their current feelings for their partner (Brosnan and de Waal, 2002; Schino
and Aureli, 2010). Thus there is no expectation that an inequity
response needs to be paired with any higher-order cognition in
order to function in this way. In fact, only partner recognition
is required, and this is likely widespread throughout the animal
kingdom (including invertebrates; Karavanich and Atema, 1998;
Tibbets, 2002; Steiger et al., 2008).
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This hypothesis also ties in nicely with other hypotheses for
why individuals respond negatively to inequity. It has been argued
that responding negatively to inequity, including when one is the
benefited party, can function as a commitment device (Frank, 1988,
2001; Yamagishi et al., 2009). Responding in this way indicates to
both one’s current and potential future partners that you are a very
good partner (i.e., you do not treat your other partners inequitably), and may also send a signal which increases one’s reputation
(Frank, 2004). Similarly, refusing absolute gains which are relatively
unequal sends a signal to potential partners that they cannot get
away with such behavior with you, which may increase future payoffs (Yamagishi et al., 2009). Such behavior represents a short-term
cost (in the form of lost immediate gains) for a long-term gain (in
the form of long-term beneficial relationships).
Evidence is beginning to emerge to support the hypothesis that
cooperation and the response to inequity are linked in species besides
humans (see Existing Evidence in Support of the Hypothesis). Such
a link may provide evidence for how the response evolved. This
question is more than academic. Understanding the evolutionary
trajectory of a behavior can help elucidate its evolutionary function. Moreover, while it is often assumed that traits within a taxon
are likely to be homologous, this does not need to be the case. My
research indicates that responding negatively to receiving less than
one’s partners is not homologous among primates, but rather is convergent, and the trait which best maps on to it is cooperation. Below
I summarize lines of evidence leading to this conclusion, relying on
data from a number of different species in several different contexts.
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Existing evidence in support of the hypothesis
If cooperation and responding to inequity are linked, a number of
predictions emerge. Three among these have already accrued some
evidence. First, inequitable outcomes should affect cooperation.
Second, negative responses to inequity should be evident in the
context of cooperation. Third, species which typically cooperate
should show a greater tendency to reject inequitable outcomes than
those which do not. Below I explore the evidence which addresses
these predictions, focusing on behavior which is disadvantageous
to the individual.
The interplay of cooperation and inequity

If cooperation and inequity are related, cooperation should be
affected by inequitable outcomes (Brosnan, 2006; de Waal and
Suchak, 2010). In fact, this question is of vital importance as it is
rare that interactions result in complete equity, at least in the short
term (Aghion et al., 1999). Thus any species which both successfully
cooperates and responds to inequity must have some capacity for
taking into account context or an ability to extrapolate over the
longer term in order to maintain cooperative interactions.
Capuchin monkeys are excellent subjects in which to investigate
this interaction as they are known to cooperate in many contexts,
and to understand the contingencies of cooperation (Brosnan,
2010). Although in most cases cooperation experiments utilize
situations in which both individuals receive identical rewards,
the few which do not are telling. In a study designed explicitly to
address this question, monkeys could cooperate on a mutual task
in which joint efforts resulted in rewards to both, but sometimes
the rewards were unequal (Brosnan et al., 2006). Unlike in many
cooperation experiments, the monkeys were not separated and thus
had to decide between themselves which individual would pull
which bar and, hence, receive which reward. Since the monkeys
determined which one worked for which reward, rather than the
experimenter, we could determine whether the presence of inequity
affected cooperation, and whether they were able to work around it.
In fact, the distribution of rewards (equal or unequal) did not affect
cooperation, but the partner’s behavior influenced it greatly. If one
individual consistently dominated the better rewards, cooperation
dropped to almost a third of the rate seen in partnerships in which
both monkeys alternated receiving the better rewards.
Intriguingly, this cessation of cooperation happened in all conditions, including equitable ones in which no reward difference
was possible. Thus, the monkeys were reacting to their partners’
behavior rather than the distribution of rewards. This is an important point; clearly the monkeys are willing to tolerate inequity on
a trial-by-trial basis as long as the overall outcomes are approximately the same. In other words, cooperation only breaks down
when faced with long-term inequity, not the occasional unequal
outcome. This explains how cooperation can be maintained in
tasks such as group hunting or mating coalitions, which may result
in unequal outcomes in the short term. Individuals will continue
to cooperate despite the occasional lesser reward if their overall
rewards remain equitable.
Other studies support this conclusion. Capuchin monkeys will
help partners obtain rewards as long as the partner then shares some
of the spoils, but, again, cooperation breaks down if no sharing
occurs (de Waal and Berger, 2000). Moreover, capuchins appear
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intrinsically less motivated to cooperate when rewards are easily
monopolizable than when rewards are distributed such that neither individual can dominate them (de Waal and Davis, 2002),
indicating that they prefer to avoid situations which may result
in inequity. Although the same studies have not been run with
chimpanzees, these apes are more likely to work to obtain a joint
reward when paired with a partner who tolerantly shares food than
one who does not (Melis et al., 2006a) and, when given the choice,
will choose a more tolerant rather than less tolerant partner with
whom to work (Melis et al., 2006b). Together, these studies indicate a close connection between cooperation and inequity, such
that cooperation can survive modest or short-term inequity, but
greater or more pervasive inequity leads to the cessation of the
cooperative interaction. Such a response is indeed advantageous,
as it allows individuals to identify partners with whom cooperation is not paying off and alter their choices in the future without
forfeiting a beneficial partnership due to one instance of cheating,
misunderstanding, or coincidence.
The context of the interaction

In humans, much has been done to investigate the role of the experiment’s context on how subjects respond to distributional inequity
(although using monetary payoffs rather than food, as in nonhuman species). One area relevant to cooperation is intentionality.
Humans clearly distinguish between acts which were determined
by another human being and those which were determined randomly, without human intervention (e.g., by a computer). Humans
respond behaviorally, less often refusing unfair outcomes when they
are determined by computer (Blount, 1995) and also show differential brain activation between human-initiated and computerinitiated distributional inequity (Knoch et al., 2006). It is typically
assumed that the explanation for this is that subjects are sensitive
to the intention behind the action; intentional actions must be
responded to, while those which were the result of chance were
“bad luck” that is not due to ones’ social partners and so do not
require a response. This sensitivity to intentionality makes sense in
light of cooperation. If your partner gets more than you do because
of chance, then there is no reason to go find a new partner; this
outcome provides no information at all about their value as a social
partner. If, on the other hand, you were working together with a
partner who then took a greater share of the benefits reaped, that
is a clue about the partner’s value, and a sign to find a new partner.
In other words, joint efforts should lead to joint outcomes (van
Wolkenten et al., 2007).
In primates, there are few studies comparing “intentional” and
“accidental” inequity, no doubt in part due to the difficulty of experimentally distinguishing chance occurrence from intentionality in
non-verbal species. However, those which do exist indicate behavior similar to that seen in humans. Primates are sensitive to the
intentionality of a human experimenter, responding more strongly
when they drop a reward intentionally than when it appears to be
an accident (Call et al., 2004). Within their own species, chimpanzees react more strongly to punish (e.g., take away access to food)
a partner who previously stole that food from them than when it
is simply an inequitable distribution (Jensen et al., 2007). In this
latter study, chimpanzees had the option to pull down a “table”
which held food their partner could access (thus taking away access
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from the partner). If the partner got the food by taking away access
from the subject, subjects were far more likely to pull down the
table than if the partner was simply granted access to the food by
the experimenter.
Primates are also quite sensitive to how rewards are received.
Specifically, primates are most sensitive to inequity in the context of
completing a task. Most inequity experiments require the subjects
to complete a task (typically an exchange of a token) to receive
their rewards (see Figure 1). However in other studies, subjects are
handed food rewards alternately, but for “free,” i.e., with no task
required to obtain the food (e.g., panels 2 and 4 in Figure 1). Thus
far, no reactions to inequity have been found in any study which
did not involve a task (Bräuer et al., 2006; Dubreuil et al., 2006;
Roma et al., 2006; Fontenot et al., 2007). This includes one study
(Dindo and de Waal, 2006) which used the same capuchin subjects
which both previously and subsequently responded to inequity in
paradigms which involved tasks. Several additional studies have
explicitly compared the presence versus absence of a task, three
using a within-subjects’ design and one a between-subjects’ design.
In a within-subjects’ design, chimpanzees showed no reaction to
inequity in the absence of a task (e.g., when rewards were handed
out for “free”), while responding when they had to complete the
task for their rewards (Brosnan et al., 2010a). In the other three
species, all refused more often when no task was used despite subjects not responding differentially between the equity and inequity
conditions (Neiworth et al., 2009; Brosnan et al., in review; Talbot
et al., in press).
There are several possibilities as to why the primates only
respond to inequity when a task is involved. First, despite claims
that the presence or absence of a task should be irrelevant (Roma
et al., 2006), animals are known to treat rewards which are earned
differently than those which are received for “free” (Carder and
Berkowitz, 1970). Moreover, since captive animals routinely receive
food from keepers in situations which are not equitable, it is possible
that they have grown accustomed to inequity in non-task situations,
and so do not respond in these situations. Finally, it may also be that
the presence of a task mimics a joint activity, despite the sequential
nature of the interaction, thus priming the individuals to expect
more equitable outcomes (Brosnan et al., 2010a).
Of course, if cooperation is linked with inequity, one would
expect other experimental or social contexts to be important as well.
Reactions to inequity are affected by group membership (Brosnan
et al., 2005), sex (Brosnan et al., 2010a), rank (Bräuer et al., 2006;
Brosnan et al., 2010a), and experimental design (Brosnan et al.,
2010a) and, as discussed above, tolerance between individuals
influences cooperative outcomes (Melis et al., 2006a). Similarly,
individuals’ personalities or relationships may play a role. This has
not been investigated in great detail in humans, possibly due to the
tendency to test subjects in completely anonymous situations, with
strangers, in part in an effort to rule out these factors as potential
causes. Non-human primate studies offer a wonderful opportunity
to investigate these factors in longitudinal studies.
A phylogenetic approach

Not all species of primates respond to inequitable outcomes. A
recent surge of studies have provided information on a far wider
range of primate species than were initially tested, indicating that
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the response is likely not a homology among primates. Although
any such analysis without information on all species is necessarily
limited, we are at the point where it is useful to begin considering
the phylogenetic data. Inequity seems to affect cooperative behavior,
and the species in which the response to inequity was first documented, capuchins and chimpanzees, are known to cooperate, both
in the laboratory (de Waal and Berger, 2000; Melis et al., 2006b)
and in the field (Creel and Creel, 1995; Fragaszy et al., 2004; Mitani,
2006; Langergraber et al., 2007), lending credence to this hypothesis.
However, while the cooperation hypothesis is compelling, it is not
the only possibility. For instance, inequity could be a homology
among primates (or a more specialized group within the primate
taxon), in which case investigations in to function will necessarily
require other taxa. Second, this behavior could be an emergent
behavior that arises when a species develops sufficient cognitive
abilities to remember and compare outcomes between themselves
and others. Third, it could also emerge as a by-product of social
living. If individuals were already predisposed to pay attention to
their partners’ outcomes, as is required, for instance, in some forms
of social learning, they may then begin comparing their outcomes in
other situations. Notice an important subtlety in these latter cases;
the ability to gain benefits from social comparison may require
certain cognitive skills, such as individual recognition, but that
is independent of whether cognition is a functional explanation
for the behavior. We can address these hypotheses by comparing
primates which vary on these dimensions. Data exist for several
species of great apes and new world monkeys, providing a more
fine-grained analysis.
For these comparisons, it is important to keep the tasks and
dependent variables as similar as possible across studies. Given that
it is clear that a task is required to elicit inequity (see The Context
of the Interaction), in all of the studies done in my laboratory we
utilized an exchange-based task (Figure 1). The dependent variables
were whether the primate completed the task and whether or not
they accepted the reward, combined as a participation measure, and
the latency to complete the interaction. Since the latter measure has
not been seen to differ between conditions of equity and inequity, I
focus here only on whether the subject refused to participate (e.g.,
refused to complete the task or accept the reward).
First considering the great apes, the response has been well documented in both humans and chimpanzees, as discussed above,
although there is variation which needs to be further explored to
fully elucidate how context affects the reaction (Brosnan et al., 2005,
2010a; Bräuer et al., 2006, 2009). Considering chimpanzees’ sister
species, bonobos, only one study has investigated bonobos in a
comparable paradigm to chimpanzees. The bonobos refused twice
as often in the inequity (approximately 20%) as compared to the
equity (approximately 10%) condition, although this difference was
not significant (possibly due to the small sample size; Bräuer et al.,
2009). This result rules out none of the potential hypotheses, but
the fact that bonobos also cooperate, both in the laboratory (Hare
et al., 2007) and the field (e.g., in social relationships; Parrish, 1996;
Hohmann and Fruth, 2000; Fruth and Hohmann, 2002), provides
support for the cooperation hypothesis.
Orangutans have also been well studied (Bräuer et al., 2006,
2009; Brosnan et al., in review). These apes do not respond negatively to inequity, even in a study which directly replicated the
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methodology which found a response in chimpanzees (Brosnan
et al., in review). These results seem to rule out the possibility
that cognitive differences are related to inequity, as orangutans are
equally skilful in cognitive (Russon, 1998; Shumaker et al., 2001)
and exchange (Flemming et al., in revision) tasks as other apes.
Moreover, they support the cooperation hypothesis, as orangutans,
while cooperative in experimental studies (Chalmeau et al., 1997;
Dufour et al., 2008), are not known to cooperate in the wild to a
great degree, possibly due to their more solitary social organization
(van Schaik and van Hooff, 1996). These results also support the
hypothesis that inequity is a by-product of sociality, as orangutans
are less gregarious than other great apes, although they do form
relationships and interact much more frequently in some contexts
than initially recognized (Edwards and Snowdon, 1980; Singleton
and van Schaik, 2002; van Schaik et al., 2009). The orangutan results
also indicate that any homology among the apes must be more
recent than the orangutan split from the African apes.
Amongst the new world monkeys, brown capuchins (Cebus
apella) have been documented to respond negatively to inequity
in all but one of four studies which employed a task (Brosnan and
de Waal, 2003; van Wolkenten et al., 2007; Fletcher, 2008; Silberberg
et al., 2009). Taken with the data on their responses to inequity in
the context of cooperation (see The Interplay of Cooperation and
Inequity above), it is clear that in many contexts, these monkeys are
sensitive to receiving less than their partner. To explicitly address
the homology hypothesis, we replicated the test on squirrel monkeys (Saimiri spp.), a species which shares a phylogenetic family,
Cebidae, with capuchins. Squirrel monkeys have a smaller brain
and neocortex volume per body size than do capuchins (Rilling
and Insel, 1999) and cooperate in only limited situations (Boinski,
1987). They are also a highly gregarious, group-living species, and
are even sympatric with capuchins in some areas. However, in our
study, squirrel monkeys did not respond negatively to inequity,
completing the interaction whether or not their partner received
a greater reward (Talbot et al., in press). They were sensitive to the
experimental paradigm; subjects were more likely to refuse to participate if the rewards violated their expectations than in the control
condition. These results indicate that the inequity response is not
homologous within the Family Cebidae, and the distribution across
new world monkeys and great apes suggests that neither sociality
nor cognition are sufficient feature to explain it. Given these data,
the one feature in common to all is frequent cooperation among
non-kin, indicating the possibility of either a convergence or the
secondary loss of the trait in non-cooperative species.
The new world monkeys also introduce an interesting caveat in
the form of the Callitrichids. Callitrichids are cooperative breeders,
meaning that the parents and, sometimes, adult offspring, work
together to rear young. Given this intensive level of cooperation
(Cronin et al., 2005), even when confronted with unequal outcomes
(Cronin and Snowdon, 2008), one might expect them to be particularly sensitive to inequity. However, among tamarins, there is little,
if any, evidence that they refuse to participate when outcomes are
unequal (Neiworth et al., 2009). Given the variation seen among
species, this result needs to be validated with additional studies of
cooperative breeders. Nonetheless, this finding may serve to validate the main tenet of the cooperation hypothesis, which is that
responding to inequity serves to increase the long-term gains from
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cooperation. In the case of cooperative breeders, the interdependency between males and females (the partners in these experiments)
may explain these results. If males and females rely on each other
for their reproductive fitness, negative responses to minor inequities
would end up being more costly than beneficial. Thus, individuals
may do best to tolerate minor inequities and respond only when
the inequitable outcomes become egregious.
Taken together, the current phylogenetic results most strongly
support the hypothesis that inequity and cooperation are interlinked, providing evidence in favor of the cooperation hypothesis for the evolution of the inequity response. Cognition may be
necessary, but is not sufficient, as great apes with brain-to-body
ratios on par with chimpanzees and capuchins, and comparable
performance in cognitive tasks, do not respond negatively to inequity. The response is not a by-product of group-living, as several
primates which are gregarious do not respond, including the highly
social Callitrichids. However, species which routinely cooperate
with non-kin in several different contexts respond negatively to
inequity, while those who do not cooperate to this degree fail to do
so. Moreover, interdependent species, which may not benefit from
such a response, fail to respond to inequity.

Implications of the hypothesis
In short, there is emerging comparative evidence that links cooperation and inequity. It is interesting to consider further implications
of the hypothesized relationship between the negative response to
inequity and cooperation.
Inequity and interdependence

One intriguing aspect of the phylogenetic data is the possible role
of interdependence in the response. Extreme interdependence
occurs among cooperatively breeding species, in which the (unrelated) adults’ genetic fitness is directly tied to the fitness of others.
This promotes cooperation (Roberts, 2005) and has been argued
to explain the unusually high levels of prosocial behavior among
mated pairs in cooperative breeding species (Clutton-Brock, 2002;
Hrdy, 2009; Jaeggi et al., 2010; Van Schaik and Burkart, 2010). In
other words, the parents are so dependent upon one another for
their fitness that it is in their best interests to help each other in
most circumstances, regardless of the cost. While there is currently
only a single study investigating inequity responses in cooperative breeders, the lack of evidence for an inequity response among
mated partners may indicate that interdependence plays a role
in inequity. Once the relationship is established, continuing the
interaction may be worthwhile even if their partner is getting a
better deal. The cost of abandoning one’s breeding partner to find
a new one due to a small act of inequity would be strongly selected
against, and only extreme inequity may be sufficient to change this
cost–benefit calculation.
Humans are worth considering in this respect. Humans also
appear to be a cooperatively breeding species (Hrdy, 2009), yet we
respond to distributional inequity. However, unlike Callitrichids,
humans routinely form cooperative relationships with individuals outside of the pair bond, and virtually all experimental tests
of inequity involve strangers, and often occur in anonymous settings. Thus, humans may be subject to two selective forces. First,
we are likely selected to be sensitive to inequity in interactions with
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individuals other than our partner, as is likely captured in studies
of inequity and cooperation in the laboratory (e.g., with non-pair
bonded individuals, who are often both strangers and anonymous).
On the other hand, we may be selected to ignore inequity within
close relationships, such as the pair bond (Clark and Grote, 2003),
as do other cooperatively breeding species. In fact, it is likely that
humans are not the only species which will show different behavior
depending upon the relationship involved, an area which needs
further investigation.
Inequity and relationships

Related to this, it is possible that interactions may differ within the
same species depending upon the relationships among the individuals in question. For instance, in species which form mated
pairs but nonetheless regularly interact and cooperate with other
individuals, one might expect no response to inequity among mated
pairs (due to interdependence), but a present response to inequity
among non-mated pair adults. For instance, this might describe
the interactions we would expect in humans, as discussed above.
Humans show reduced sensitivity to inequity in close relationships
as compared to more distant ones, which are typically more contingent (Clark and Grote, 2003). As another example, individuals
within a cooperative breeding group may have differential investment in the group, or differential cost to finding a new partner.
Less invested individuals, or those who can more easily find new
partners, should be less tolerant of inequity. Similar patterns may
apply in other species which cooperate across many different types
of relationships.

Cooperation and responses to inequity

Inequity and punishment

While the main purpose of the response to inequity seems to be
recognizing when it is time to find a new partner with whom to
cooperate, in some situations switching to a new partner may
not be an option (e.g., due to low availability of other partners, a
high cost to switching, or the difficulty in establishing sufficient
trust for cooperation to emerge at the same level). In these cases,
the recognition of a partner’s low quality that derives from the
inequity response may secondarily be used to identify situations in
which it is worth an attempt to alter the current partner’s behavior,
including punishment (Jensen, 2010; Raihani et al., 2010). This
provides an alternate option through which individuals can try
to increase their benefits for cooperating; if they cannot leave and
find a new partner, they may be able to try changing the behavior of the current one. Even the occasional act of punishment
may be sufficient to alter the partner’s behavior for the better
(Bergmüller and Taborsky, 2005).Thus punishment may be more
likely in those species which have limited options for finding a
new partner or for which such an action is extremely costly, one
practical implication of which is that it may be easier to identify
punishment in species which are known to react behaviorally
to inequity, but in situations in which individuals have limited
options for finding new partners.

Inequity and related behaviors
Inequity is related to several behaviors, either because these behaviors may contribute to the mechanisms which allow individuals to
refuse inequitable outcomes, or because the ability has implications
for the behavior. Below I consider two of these.

Inequity and life history

Another prediction which emerges is that responses to inequity
may differ across life history stages. Some species have different
relationships with others of their age class depending upon where
they are in development. For instance, polygynous species may
go through a stage in an adult single-sex group (e.g., a “bachelor
group”) prior to becoming the alpha male of a mixed-sex group.
In some cases, individuals may even have different relationships
with different individuals during the same life history stage, and so
show several different behaviors at any given time (but with different partners, e.g., humans; see above sections). Since relationships
and the frequency of cooperation differ in these different stages of
development, reactions to inequity may vary as well.
An intriguing corollary of this prediction is the possibility of
particularly enhanced responses to inequity among individuals who
are in the process of forming pair bonds. Given that individuals are
in the process of forming a bond which is both critical to reproductive fitness and costly to break, individuals may be best served
to be hyper vigilant for signs of inequity. In this way they may be
able to predict future behavior from current actions and limit the
subsequent costs of either inequity or the requirement to find a
new mate. This may also provide a likely opportunity to investigate
deception, as there would be strong selection in favor of behaving
more equitably in the mating market than once the pair bond was
formed. Finally, individuals may be particularly likely to tolerate
inequity once there is a reproductive investment in the relationship.
Thus inequity may be a mechanism individuals can use to assess
partner potential early in a relationship.
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Inequity and self-control

Refusing a present and available reward seems to require quite a lot
of self-control. Primates are known to be good at this (Beran, 2002;
Evans and Westergaard, 2006; Dufour et al., 2007), and even use
behavioral distraction strategies to assist in refraining from reaching for foods (Evans and Beran, 2007a), both of which indicate that
primates have the requisite abilities for the refusals seen in inequity
responses. One intriguing possibility is that differences in species’
ability to delay gratification may be related to their tendency to
refuse rewards in the context of inequity. Given than there is species
variation in the ability to delay gratification, for instance with apes
outperforming monkeys (Evans and Beran, 2007b), it will be interesting to see whether this prediction is supported. It may also be that
increasing selection for negative reactions to inequity simultaneously
selected for increased self-control ability. Ecological forces are known
to shape self-control ability in other contexts (Stevens et al., 2005). On
the flip side, the cognitive challenge of self-control may serve to limit
which species are able to respond to inequity by refusing rewards.
Inequity and prosocial behavior

All of the studies discussed above focus on how individuals respond
when they receive less than a partner. However, it is equally interesting to investigate responses when they receive more than a partner.
In particular, whether species will bring rewards to their partners
has been of interest to investigate the evolution of human social
behavior. Presumably the mechanisms which allow individuals to
compare their outcomes to those of others and recognize when
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they receive less would work equally well to identify situations in
which they receive more. However, the selective pressures are quite
different, thus the behaviors may not manifest equally.
Nonetheless, recent studies indicate that they co-occur and may
even interact. Although studies show that chimpanzees are unlikely
to bring food rewards to conspecifics (Silk et al., 2005; Jensen et al.,
2006; Vonk et al., 2008), they do help other individuals (Warneken
and Tomasello, 2006; Warneken et al., 2007). Moreover, in food
situations they also notice when they receive more than a partner,
refusing preferred rewards more often when their partners receive
less preferred ones than when they also receive the preferred fruit
(Brosnan et al., 2010a). This indicates that while individuals may
not work to improve their partners’ wellbeing, they do notice the
disparity.
Capuchins are quite prosocial, possibly moreso than chimpanzees, and bring rewards to conspecific partners in several situations (de Waal et al., 2008; Lakshminarayanan and Santos, 2008). A
recent study specifically investigated how prosocial behavior interacted with inequity, and found that capuchins were prosocial (e.g.,
brought food rewards to partners) even in situations in which their
partners received more, or even when the puller received nothing.
However, when inequity became greater, prosocial behavior ceased
(Brosnan et al., 2010b). Thus, emerging evidence indicates that
these two preferences interact to shape behavior. Further research
is needed that investigates these two behaviors in additional species,
including those which do not respond to inequity, to determine the
degree of overlap, and the limits of prosociality.

Thoughts on the evolution of inequity
Why the response makes sense in light of natural selection

Why should we care if another individual gets more than we
do? This is particularly true if our outcome is a net gain, or
if the response actually increases inequity, a common result in
these experiments (see above and Brosnan and de Waal, 2003;
Brosnan et al., 2005; Yamagishi et al., 2009). In these cases, it
seems particularly surprising that any rational individual would
choose an outcome which makes them less well off in the short
term. On the other hand, a negative reaction to inequity is not
particularly surprising. First of all, despite a focus on cost–benefit analysis in behavioral studies, the entire concept of natural
selection is based on relative gains, not absolute ones. Thus, there
is every reason to expect natural selection to favor behaviors
which increase relative gains, even at the expense of absolute
outcomes, or which favor long-term benefits over short-term
costs (e.g. Frank, 1988). Note, of course, that this does not mean
that the individual must understand this comparison; the beauty
of natural selection is that any behavior which increases relative
fitness, however inadvertently, will be selected, regardless of the
animals’ comprehension of either their behavior, their relative
outcomes, or their benefits (see Hypotheses for the Function of
the Response to Inequity).
Second, many of the mechanisms for the behavior seem to be in
place. As discussed above (see Inequity Paradigms in Other Species),
contrast effects occur in a variety of species, and it does not seem to
be a great cognitive leap from comparing one’s current outcomes to
one’s own previous outcomes, to comparing one’s current outcomes
to one’s partners’ previous outcomes. Moreover, we already know
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that many species pay close attention to their partners’ behavioral
outcomes. Any species that socially learns receives information from
a conspecific which changes their behavior, even if they are not
consciously aware of it (as they do not need to be consciously aware
of inequity for it to provide a benefit). Social learning is widespread
among animals (Zentall et al., 1988; Heyes et al., 1996), and some
species are quite nuanced, with individuals paying attention to
relevant features of the social partner when determining whether
to copy their actions (Swaney et al., 2001; Biro et al., 2003; Perry,
2009; Hopper, 2010; Horner et al., 2010).
A potential evolutionary pathway

Of course, this is a correlative relationship; we do not know which
came first, the response to inequity or the tendency to cooperate.
Although it is challenging to test experimentally, some evidence
provides at least a hint of which direction evolution may have
taken. It seems, at this stage, more likely that cooperative behavior evolved first, followed by selection for inequity. Many species
cooperate occasionally, and such interactions may lead to small
rewards (or small losses) without the risk of a major cost. It is
only when cooperation becomes common that some mechanism
for avoiding excessive losses becomes essential. Thus, individuals who came under selection for more extensive cooperation
because of the benefits such behavior accrued would similarly
come under strong selection to limit their cooperative interactions to partners who shared the resulting rewards. Those who
managed to do so, by changing partners when outcomes deviated substantially, would have gained far more than those who
indiscriminately cooperated with all potential social partners with
whom there was a net benefit.
It is worth considering a pathway through which the response to
inequity might have evolved. Cooperation occurs when the benefits
to both individuals exceed their costs (Bshary and Bergmuller,
2008; Brosnan et al., 2010c). From a purely cost–benefit perspective, it should not matter if A’s benefit exceeds B’s; it should still
be to B’s benefit to participate in the interaction. But what if B
could reap a far greater benefit by cooperating with C? By recognizing (note, again, that this need not imply cognitive calculation or understanding) only whether the cost exceeds the benefit,
B may miss this opportunity. Thus in cooperative interactions
there should be pressure to maximize outcomes by evaluating
whether there are other, more lucrative options in the environment. Responding to inequity would be a mechanism to do this;
situations in which one’s payoffs deviate substantially from one’s
social partners could be a reliable signal to evaluate other options.
In this scenario inequity aversion would serve as the mechanism
to evaluate when there is the possibility to increase one’s benefit
from cooperative interactions, and as such function to maximize
the outcomes from cooperation.
Note that this will be selected only if the additional gains
from a new partner exceed the cost of switching partners (e.g.,
search costs) and the risk of a worse outcome. The latter occurs
either if outcomes with C – the new partner – are worse than
those with B or if the initial difference in outcomes between A
and B was minimal. Moreover, if the individual accrues indirect
benefits from staying (i.e., the partner is related, or is assisting
with offspring care), responses to inequity may not be selected.
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Thus, the theory predicts that responding to inequity may be
more beneficial for some types of cooperation than others. For
instance, this response may be more likely to be selected in situations with potentially high costs to doing relatively less well
than one’s partners, for instance in winner-take-all situations
such as mating coalitions.

What is needed next?
Data from other species and relationships

While this paper is almost exclusively about non-human primates,
it will be important to test this theory in other taxa (Drea and
Frank, 2003; Bekoff and Pierce, 2010). There are several taxa, for
instance canids, cetaceans, and birds, in which some species show
a greater tendency to cooperate than others. There are also nonprimate cooperative breeders, allowing all three aspects of this
hypothesis to be tested more broadly. In particular we need data
on not just species which routinely cooperate, but also on closely
related species which do not do so in order to further evaluate the
link between inequity and cooperation. Finally, it would be useful
to test combinations of individuals which are not often addressed
(e.g., cooperative breeders which are not part of the same mated
pair) in order to address some of the additional implications of the
theory, as outlined above.
Data from other contexts

We also need data from a broader variety of situations. For
instance, primates respond to differences in outcomes, but do not
seem to respond to differences in the effort required to achieve
those outcomes (Fontenot et al., 2007; van Wolkenten et al., 2007).
However, responses to inequity may occur in situations other than
differential food distributions; for instance, several studies have
found links between equity and play behavior in non-human species (Bekoff, 2001, 2004; Dugatkin and Bekoff, 2003; van Leeuwen
et al., 2010). Despite the fact that food rewards are particularly
relevant, making them an easy way to study behavior in experimental situations, some species may respond differently to food than
non-food situations (Warneken et al., 2007). Thus it is important
to collect data from a broader, and more species-representative,
array of situations.
Related to this, measures of inequity other than the rate of
reward refusal or the rate of refusal to participate in the task will
help clarify the range of situations in which responses to inequity
occur. These measures are useful, as they are easy to quantify and the
methodology can be used across a wide variety of species. However,
giving up a desirably food reward requires quite a cost on the part
of the individual, potentially making this less likely to occur than
other behaviors. Thus more nuanced behavioral (such as changes
in affect) and physiological (such as skin conductance or heart
rate) measures may help to uncover situations in which individuals, responses to inequity are not so explicit. This is particularly
important in species for which there is no evidence of such explicit
responses to inequity.
Finally, there are other situations in which inequity may occur.
A recent study finds evidence that in their play behavior, gorillas are sensitive to their immediate social status, and work to
maintain social inequities that increase their status with respect
to another individual (van Leeuwen et al., 2010). These results
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point to a promising new avenue for investigating sensitivity to
inequity, particularly in species which do not respond to distributional inequity. Such results may also help to distinguish between
sensitivity to inequity and reactivity to inequity, the latter being the
important criteria for the current hypothesis. These situations may
also clarify the range of situations in which responses to inequity
may be relevant.
The difference between noticing inequity and responding to
inequity

One critical area of study is whether or not individuals notice inequity. Current studies measure whether individuals react to inequity, however it is possible to recognize it in situations in which
individuals do not respond. For instance, do cooperative breeders
fail to notice that their partner receives more, or have they been
selected to not respond because of the high costs of finding a new
partner? Are the individual differences in responses due to some
individuals failing to notice inequity, or conditions in some situations (e.g., some relationships) not favoring the response? This
has important implications for whether behavior will change as the
degree of inequity increases. In fact we do know that despite little
evidence of prosocial behavior in the form of active giving (Silk
et al., 2005; Jensen et al., 2006; Vonk et al., 2008), chimpanzees do
alter their behavior when they receive more than a partner (Brosnan
et al., 2010a), indicating that they notice, despite not changing their
behavior in any way that alters the outcomes. Future studies which
can continue to tease apart this difference will be critical for fully
understanding the evolution of the response.
Understanding the variation

Another pressing line of research is to better understand the
variations in the response among individuals of the same species.
Although a variety of factors are known to cause variation in the
response (see Inequity Paradigms in Other Species), no factor has
yet emerged which explains the variation consistently. Thus, additional research to clarify the role of individual factors, such as sex,
age, reproductive status, and personality, as well as social factors,
such as the relationships between individuals and group behavior,
are required. This is a logistical challenge, as such comparisons
require a large sample sizes of individuals who are tested in multiple
combinations, which can be difficult to obtain, particularly among
larger species such as primates. Nonetheless, research in this area
is ongoing and the extra level of control possible in non-human
research may yield additional insights to and predictions about
human behavior (Brosnan et al., 2009).
Testing the evolutionary model

Finally, it is important to test the proposed evolutionary model
of inequity responses. Of course, testing possible evolutionary
pathways is by necessity a roundabout approach, but there are
some interesting possibilities. First, the experimental economics
approach is ideal for designing games which allow for direct comparisons across multiple species or multiple conditions. Among
non-humans in particular, it is possible to test the same individuals repeatedly, engaging them in multiple different types of games
(with different parameters and payoffs) and with multiple partners
over extended periods of time. This has been done successfully
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using a coordination game (Brosnan et al., 2011) and this approach
can be extended to games (e.g., trust, prisoner’s dilemma) or payoff
structures which address the inequity hypothesis.
Alternatively, many of the parameters of this model could
be tested individually. For instance, we know that when given a
choice, chimpanzees actively choose partners who share food over
those who do not (Melis et al., 2006a,b). Paradigms such as this
could be expanded to investigate how increased partner choice
affects reactions to inequity. Additional experimental manipulations would also be useful. For instance, the model predicts that
individuals would be more likely to choose a new partner as inequity rises, which could be tested by manipulating outcomes (e.g.,
altering payoffs) and documenting any effects on partner choice.
Although each of these may test only a component of the model,
taken together they provide validation (or not) for key features
which are implicated.

Conclusion

individuals who solicit other, potentially more equitable partners.
Nonetheless, short-term inequity does not appear to disrupt cooperative relationships. Given that many interactions do not typically result
in complete equality, this flexibility may clear the way for cooperation to persist despite modest inequality, while long-term inequity
can be used as a cue that a particular cooperative relationship is
no longer beneficial. Moreover, there is a correlation between the
degree to which individuals of a species cooperate with non-kin
and the presence of a behavioral response to inequitable outcomes.
Although these data are correlational, rather than causal, they provide
important evidence regarding the function of the inequity response
in decision-making, as well as emphasizing the power of phylogenetic
methods in illuminating evolutionary function. Despite the difficulties inherent in collecting such data, it is possible to design behavioral
studies which can be run across multiple species. These phylogenetic
comparisons can be extremely useful in investigating the evolution
of decision-making and other behaviors.

Despite the fact that both humans and other species make decisions which indicate an aversion to inequitable outcomes which are
disadvantageous, evidence regarding the function of the behavior
has been limited. New evidence discussed in this review develops
the hypothesis that recognizing inequity assists individuals in finding new partners with whom they will achieve a greater benefit,
increasing the payoffs from cooperation over the long term. In joint
situations, individuals cease cooperating with partners who consistently dominate better rewards, giving a selective advantage to those
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